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COMMENTS
Seeking Justice for Grandma:
Challenging Mandatory Arbitration in
Nursing Home Contracts
ANDI ALPER*

I. INTRODUCTION
Mandatory arbitration provisions in nursing home admission contracts have become rather ubiquitous,1 but there are a variety of legal arguments to refute enforcement of these provisions. 2 Arbitration provisions in nursing home admission contracts can be biased in favor of the nursing home and limit available remedies to
plaintiffs.3 Even though nursing homes may benefit from arbitration, it can be damaging to nursing home residents and their families when residents have been injured
or killed as a result of the nursing home’s actions or inaction.
This Comment advocates against the use of mandatory arbitration in nursing
home admission contracts and discusses various legal theories available to refute
such clauses. Part II discusses mandatory arbitration in general and its use in nursing home admission contracts. Part III summarizes some of the common arguments
made in favor of and against arbitration in nursing home admission contracts. Finally, Part IV addresses how courts analyze these agreements and possible approaches to avoid arbitration of disputes arising out of the nursing home contract.

* B.A., Washington University in St. Louis 2013, J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law
2017. I would like to thank the editorial staff of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for the time spent
helping edit this Comment.
1. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 103-289 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
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II. OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND NURSING HOME
CONTRACTS
A.

Origins of Mandatory Arbitration: The Federal Arbitration Act

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts viewed arbitration 4
with hostility and disapproval.5 In 1925, Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act,6 codified in 1947 as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 7 The FAA
evidenced an attempt to alleviate years of judicial hostility towards arbitration. 8 The
FAA governs the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate disputes in maritime transactions or any contracts involving interstate commerce. 9 Section 2 of the FAA, the
“primary substantive provision of the Act,”10 makes arbitration agreements “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”11 Under the FAA, arbitration allows parties to enter
into contracts specifying issues that they have agreed to submit to arbitration. 12 In
theory, mandatory arbitration13 under the FAA improves efficiency within the justice system by decreasing the number of claims brought in court as well as decreasing the time and costs necessary to resolve disputes.14
Despite the codification of the FAA in 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court did not
interpret the FAA favorably until the 1980s.15 In 1983, the Court endorsed Section
4. Arbitration is defined as “A dispute-resolution process in which the disputing parties choose one
or more neutral third parties to make a final and binding decision resolving the dispute.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
5. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1942);
Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 476; Alison Brooke Overby, Arbitrability of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1986); Anjanette H.
Raymond, It Is Time the Law Begins to Protect Consumers From Significantly One-Sided Arbitration
Clauses Within Contracts of Adhesion, 91 NEB. L. REV. 666, 668 (2013); Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme
Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 98 (2012).
6. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925).
7. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(2012)).
8. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,
552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008). Both the House Report and Senate Report accompanying this legislation identified judicial hostility as the impetus for the legislation. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (discussing
the jurisdictional “jealousy” of the courts and the resulting refusal to enforce arbitration agreements,
necessitating legislative action). The Senate Report reflects the same sentiment. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at
2-3 (1924) (discussing resistance to enforcing arbitration agreements and the reasons for that resistance).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). Since the FAA applies to arbitration required by contractual agreements, it
is considered “mandatory arbitration.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This Article will
use the terms “arbitration,” “binding arbitration,” and “mandatory arbitration” interchangeably, but all
refer to any arbitration required by a contractual agreement.
10. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
11. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
12. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
13. Arbitration required by contractual agreements, like arbitration covered under the FAA, is defined
as “mandatory arbitration.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This Article will use the terms
“arbitration” and “mandatory arbitration” interchangeably, but both refer to any arbitration contained in
a contract.
14. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010).
15. Burton, supra note 5, at 476-77 (discussing three cases in the 1980s epitomizing the Supreme
Court’s federal policy favoring arbitration); Wilson, supra note 5, at 102-06 (discussing the evolution of
the Supreme Court’s attitude towards arbitration from the 1960s to the 1980s).
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2 of the FAA as “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” 16 The
Court declared that Section 2 “create[d] a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability”17 that is “applicable in state and federal courts.”18 As such, state courts
may regulate contracts and any arbitration clauses “under general contract law principles”;19 they may invalidate an arbitration clause using general contract defenses
“such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability” without conflicting with the FAA. 20
However, state courts cannot invalidate arbitration agreements solely based on laws
specific to arbitration or laws that undermine the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.21 Because of this policy and the encouragement of the Supreme Court,
mandatory arbitration agreements have become common in various types of consumer contracts,22 especially in nursing home23 admission contracts.24

B.

Use of Mandatory Arbitration in Nursing Home Admission Contracts

Admitting a loved one into a nursing home is an emotional and exhausting process that often takes place under emergent circumstances. 25 Typically, a worried
child or spouse must find a safe refuge that can provide the immediately necessary
care for a physically or mentally frail family member.26 The decision to admit a
loved one is a stressful one, whether it is temporary or permanent. 27 Since the need
16. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). See Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”).
17. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24.
18. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
19. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
20. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
21. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339, 343 (2011) (holding that the FAA does
not preserve state laws that contradict the purpose of the FAA).
22. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1631
(2005).
23. “Nursing home,” as defined under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396g(e)(1) (2012), includes “any institution or facility defined as such for licensing purposes under State law, or, if State law
does not employ the term nursing home, the equivalent term or terms as determined by the Secretary,
but does not include a religious nonmedical health care institution.”
24. Nora Lockwood Tooher, Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Admissions Becoming Widespread, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA (Sept. 27, 2004). In the late 1990s, a number of juries awarded exorbitantly high damages to nursing home residents in personal injuries suits, so many nursing homes responded by including binding arbitration agreements in their admission contracts. Nathan Koppel, Nursing Homes, in Bid to Cut Costs, Prod Patients to Forgo Lawsuits; Big Payouts Fade As Arbitration
Rises; Ms. Hight Falls Ill, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120786025242805879.html.
25. See Cynthia L. Barrett, Dealing With Facility Admissions Agreements, SL071 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 231, 238 (2006); Amy Parise DeLaney, Maneuvering the Labyrinth of LongTerm Care Admissions Contracts, 4 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATTY’S J. 35, 37 (2008) (“Contracts between seniors needing care and facilities providing care are often presented at difficult and inopportune
times, fraught with significant emotion, stress, and often, guilt.”); Denese Ashbaugh Vlosky et al., “Sayso”As a Predictor of Nursing Home Readiness, 93 J. FAM. & CONSUMER SCIS. 59, 59 (2001) (“Nursing
home placement often follows a major health crisis when decisions have to be made quickly.”).
26. Barrett, supra note 25.
27. Maureen Armour, A Nursing Home’s Good Faith Duty “To” Care: Redefining A Fragile Relationship Using the Law of Contract, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 217, 225 (1994); Ann E. Krasuski, Comment,
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not Belong in Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8
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for nursing home care often arises unexpectedly, 28 many new residents and their
families do not read the admission contract carefully,29 nor do they possess adequate
business acumen to understand the arbitration agreement or the rights they may be
signing away.30 Moreover, these complicated legal agreements often comprise just
one of many documents in many nursing home admission packages31 that must be
signed prior to or immediately upon admission. 32
Nursing homes routinely include arbitration provisions in their admission contracts.33 In fact, “most of the nation’s largest nursing home chains, including Integrated Health Services, Beverly Industries, Kindred Healthcare, and Mariner, include arbitration agreements in their admissions packets.” 34 Mandatory arbitration
agreements in nursing home admission contracts received national attention in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown,35 in which the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the FAA preempted any state law or public policy limiting arbitration,
with no exception for claims of personal injury or wrongful death. 36 The decision
illustrated the Court’s “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.”37 Notwithstanding the Court’s Decision in Marmet, mandatory arbitration in
nursing home admission contracts has become a highly contested area of law, 38 and
state courts have reached widely different results when faced with the enforceability
of arbitration agreements in nursing home admission contracts. 39

DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 263-64 (2004) (noting that admission into nursing homes is a time of extreme stress for admittees and their families).
28. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 302.
29. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 263-64.
30. Jana Pavlic, Reverse Pre-Empting the Federal Arbitration Act: Alleviating the Arbitration Crisis
in Nursing Homes, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 375, 385 (2009).
31. Armour, supra note 27, at 225 n.35 (describing an admissions packet that contains fifty-one separate items).
32. Michelle Andrews, You Don’t Have to Sign Away Your Right to Take a Nursing Home to Court,
WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2012), http://search.proquest.com/docview/1040744968?accountid=14576;
Kelly Bagby & Samantha Souza, Ending Unfair Arbitration: Fighting Against the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements in Long-Term Care Contracts, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 183, 185-86
(2013).
33. Laura M. Owings & Mark N. Geller, The Inherent Unfairness of Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Admission Contracts, 43 TENN. B.J. 20, 20 (Mar. 2007).
34. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 268.
35. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012) (per curiam).
36. Id. at 1203. However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of whether, absent
the public policy rationale against arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts, the arbitration
clauses at issue “are unenforceable under state common law principles that are not specific to arbitration
and pre-empted by the FAA.” Id. at 1204.
37. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 565 U.S. at 533 (quoting KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25
(2011) (per curiam)).
38. See Reed R. Bates & Stephen W. Still, Jr., Arbitration in Nursing Home Cases: Trends, Issues,
and A Glance into the Future, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 282, 282 (2009); Katherine Palm, Arbitration Clauses
in Nursing Home Admission Agreements: Framing the Debate, 14 ELDER L. J. 453, 453 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Mathews v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 177 P.3d 867, 871 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (requiring arbitration of all claims); Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 976 N.E.2d 344, 360 (Ill. 2012)
(requiring arbitration of the Nursing Home Care Act claim but not the wrongful death claim); Miller v.
Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Mass. 2007) (holding the same); Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d
525, 529, 530 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (holding arbitration not required); Texas Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v.
Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding arbitration not required).
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III. DEBATING MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN NURSING HOME ADMISSION
CONTRACTS
A.

Policy Arguments in Favor of Mandatory Arbitration

Proponents of mandatory arbitration believe the agreements are a cost-effective
and time-efficient tool.40 Arbitration is more informal than litigation,41 “reducing
the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.” 42 The informality of arbitration “enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means
for dispute resolution.”43 A 2015 study on liability claim costs in the long term care
profession in the United States reveals that “claims resolved under arbitration agreements have a lower cost and settle more quickly.” 44
Moreover, arbitration enhances party autonomy because parties can design the
dispute resolution process and tailor the arbitration to the needs of their case. 45 Specifically, “[a]rbitration eases the burden on clogged court dockets; it offers parties
an opportunity to submit disputes to one experienced in that field of business.” 46
The U.S. Supreme Court also believes that the “discretion in designing arbitration
processes . . . allow[s] for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of
dispute,” which reduces the cost and time of resolving disputes.47 As such, arbitration improves efficiency by sending disputes to the appropriate forum “for proactive
treatment and resolution.”48
In the health care context, nursing homes favor arbitration over litigation because arbitrators often grant lower awards than juries. 49 Juries notoriously award
exorbitantly high damages to victims of nursing home negligence. 50 For example,
in a negligence suit against a nursing home, a resident died “from dehydration as a
40. Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Patrick J.
Leahy, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (July 30, 2008), http://www.citizen.org/documents/DOJ%20-%2007-30-08%20Ltr.pdf.
41. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974) (“The record of the arbitration
proceeding is not as complete [as judicial proceedings]; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and
rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination,
and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.”).
42. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011). See also Birkey Design Grp.,
Inc. v. Egle Nursing Home, Inc., 687 A.2d 256, 258 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (“Arbitration is an informal, expeditious, and inexpensive alternative to conventional litigation.”); Burton, supra note 5, at
481 (Arbitration is “quicker and cheaper for the parties than litigation, even after the costs and fees are
taken into account.”).
43. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58.
44. AON GLOBAL RISK CONSULTING, LONG TERM CARE GENERAL LIABILITY AND PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS 3 (2015), https://www.ahcancal.org/research_data/liability/Documents/2015%20General%20Liability%20and%20Professional%20Liability%20Actuarial%20Analysis%20Report.pdf.
45. Burton, supra note 5, at 479.
46. Birkey Design Grp., Inc., 687 A.2d at 258.
47. AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 344-45; see also Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 (“Indeed, it is the
informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious
means for dispute resolution.”).
48. Karen Ignagni, Liability and Health Care: Time for a Fresh Approach, 10 METRO. CORP. COUNS.
34, 34 (2004).
49. Alan Bloom et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution in Health Care, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 61, 76
(1995).
50. See Krasuski, supra note 27, at 266-67. From 1995 to 1998, jury awards of compensatory damages
have increased four times to an average of $1.3 million. Id. at 266.
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consequence of neglect that resulted from the understaffing of [the nursing
home].”51 The jury awarded the plaintiff “$11.5 million in compensatory damages
and $80 million in punitive damages.”52 On appeal, the court reduced damages to
just under $4.6 million in compensatory damages and almost $32 million in punitive
damages.53
Proponents believe that reducing the costs of litigation through arbitration is
the best solution to exorbitant jury awards.54 High jury awards cause nursing homes
to increase their rates, which leads to higher costs for patients and their families and
may leave potential nursing home residents without care. 55 High jury awards also
result in increasing costs of insurance to nursing homes, consequently increasing
rates for patient insurance. 56 By lowering awards, arbitration helps nursing homes
combat the increasing cost of insurance.57 Finally, lower awards allow nursing
homes to focus financial resources on patients’ care rather than litigation.58 Specifically, by allocating money towards hiring more nursing home employees, arbitration helps combat understaffing, which “jeopardize[s] the health and safety of [nursing home] residents.”59
Arbitration is also gaining public support. One survey indicates that from 1999
to 2003, the number of Americans who preferred arbitration over a lawsuit for monetary damages increased by 5 percent from 59 percent to 64 percent.60 Supporters
of arbitration point to the national policy favoring arbitration and recommend that
state governments should enact arbitration policies that balance the power of the
contracting parties to protect patient interests, thus legitimizing arbitration as a dispute resolution method for nursing homes and their residents.61

B.

Policy Arguments Against Mandatory Arbitration

Despite the frequency of arbitration provisions in nursing home admission contracts, mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing home admission contracts face
intense opposition.62 Opponents of mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing
home admission contracts include congressional representatives 63 and the American
51. Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, 763 S.E.2d 73, 106-07 (W. Va. 2014).
52. Id. at 80.
53. Id. at 94 (reducing compensatory damages to $4,594,615.22 and punitive damages to
$31,978,521.93).
54. Margaret Baumer, Keep Arbitration Alive: Why the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act
Should Not Be Passed, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 155, 157 (2010).
55. Baumer, supra note 54, at 173.
56. Baumer, supra note 54, at 173.
57. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 266; Andrews, supra note 32.
58. Koppel, supra note 24.
59. Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, 763 S.E.2d 73, 96 (W. Va. 2014).
60. NAT’L ARBITRATION FORUM, THE CASE FOR PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
EFFECTIVE AND AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CONSUMERS EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND SURVEY
RESULTS
9
(2004),
http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics/2004EmpiricalStudies.pdf.
61. Baumer, supra note 54, at 173.
62. Palm, supra note 38, at 454.
63. Letter from Senators to Andy Slavitt, Acting Administrator, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents/150923CMSArbitration.pdf
(requesting a prohibition of binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses in long-term care facility contracts).
In 2009, Senators tried but failed to pass “The Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act,” which would
amend the FAA to make “pre-dispute arbitration agreement between a long-term care facility and a
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Arbitration Association,64 the largest arbitration provider worldwide. 65 The American Arbitration Association believes that many nursing home residents are not in
the appropriate state of mind to evaluate arbitration agreements. 66 While consumer
arbitration agreements preclude the litigation of contract claims, arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts prevent residents from trying any tort claims, such
as negligence or abuse, before a jury. 67
Moreover, nursing homes and residents have inherently and grossly unequal
bargaining power68 because nursing homes draft admission contracts and can tailor
terms to their advantage.69 Such terms are typically nonnegotiable.70 As a result,
critics argue that almost all nursing home admission agreements are adhesion contracts71 that are “drafted and ‘imposed’ by a strong party on another with less bargaining power.”72 In July 2015, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
proposed changes for binding arbitration agreements for long-term care facilities
such as nursing homes73 because of their concern “that the facilities’ superior bargaining power could result in a resident feeling coerced into signing the agreement.”74 Although contracts of adhesion “are not automatically void,”75 they make
it easier to argue that the agreement is substantively unconscionable. 76
resident of a long-term care facility (or anyone acting on behalf of such a resident, including a person
with financial responsibility for that resident)” invalid and unenforceable. Fairness in Nursing Home
Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009).
64. Koppel, supra note 24 (writing that the American Arbitration Association disapproves of mandatory arbitration in disputes over nursing-home care and generally refuses such cases).
65. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, Dispute Resolution Services, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/services/disputeresolutionservices (last visited Nov. 20, 2015).
66. Koppel, supra note 24.
67. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 292 (“[A]rbitration agreements in nursing homes deny vulnerable individuals who have been neglected or abused by their caregivers the opportunity to raise tort claims in
court.”).
68. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 187.
69. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 267; Paul Bland, Fighting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 48 TRIAL
22, 24 (OCT. 2012).
70. See Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 548 n.16 (Mass. 2007) (finding a contract of adhesion because the nursing home provided the terms of the contract and the contract was not the subject of active
negotiation); Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So.
3d 695, 701 (Miss. 2009) (citation omitted) (holding that nursing home admission contracts were contracts of adhesion when the contracts were “drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented
on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis to the weaker party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its
terms.”).
71. GEORGE J. AGICH, DEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY IN OLD AGE 26 (2003); Suzanne Gallagher,
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Admission Agreements: The Rights of Elders, 3 NAELA J.
187, 188 (2007).
72. Burton, supra note 5, at 479. See also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600
(1991) (defining adhesion contracts as “form contracts offered on a take-or-leave basis by a party with
stronger bargaining power to a party with weaker power.”).
73. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 80
Fed. Reg. 42168, 42211 (proposed July 16, 2015). The proposed rule requires facilities to explain arbitration agreements to residents and select a neutral arbitrator in a venue convenient to both parties. The
rule also requires that binding arbitration agreements be entered into voluntarily, not as a condition of
admission. Finally, arbitration agreements should be completely separate agreements, not included in
“any other agreement or paperwork addressing any other issues.” Id.
74. Id. The proposed rule also suggests that “the increasing prevalence of these agreements could be
detrimental to residents’ health and safety.” Id.
75. E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 716 (Miss. 2002); Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254
F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 2001).
76. Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds, 14 So. 3d 695, 701 (Miss. 2009).
See discussion infra Part IV, Sec. 4.
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In addition, mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing home admission contracts may identify “industry-friendly” arbitrators or hold proceedings at locations
inconvenient for residents.77 Nursing homes can also avoid plaintiff-friendly statutes by requiring a shorter length of time to file complaints than state statutes of
limitation and limiting damages by instituting caps below statutory caps or excluding attorney’s fees, which do not have statutory limits. 78
Additionally, the unique nature of the typical nursing home admission experience likely puts elderly residents at a severe bargaining disadvantage.79 Admittance
into a nursing home is an emotional experience occurring in a tense and unfamiliar
setting,80 often in response to an urgent and sudden need. 81 As a result, the admittee
may not have the opportunity to read carefully the admission contracts or have time
to seek and carefully consider alternative facilities.82 Therefore, critics believe it is
disingenuous for nursing homes to claim later that the resident or the resident’s
family member “consciously, knowingly and deliberately accepted an arbitration
clause in the contract” that would preclude them from having a jury decide whether
a nursing home negligently injured or killed the resident. 83 These notable aspects
of the nursing home admission process make mandatory arbitration agreements in
admission contracts more harmful than arbitration agreements in other situations. 84
The nature of arbitration itself may disadvantage nursing home residents and
their families. For example, arbitration lacks public accountability since arbitration
hearings are confidential.85 Additionally, it is more difficult to appeal arbitration
than a court ruling.86 Arbitration agreements often cap the amount that a plaintiff
can recover in damages, and even those with no cap tend to result in lower awards
than a trial would typically produce.87 Finally, by compelling plaintiffs to argue
their claims in arbitration rather than court, nursing homes make it more difficult
for such claimants to obtain attorneys. 88 Attorneys who take cases on contingent
fees may refuse to arbitrate claims because the likely lower recovery in arbitration
will not be adequate compensation for the case.89

77. Baumer, supra note 54, at 171.
78. Baumer, supra note 54, at 171.
79. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 263-64 (noting that the need for nursing care often arises unexpectedly
and that admission is a time of extreme stress for residents and their families, during which they sign
arbitration agreements as one of a number of documents given to them at the same time).
80. Richard Dollinger, New Battle Over the Future of Elder Care: Arbitration vs. Litigation, N.Y. L.J.
(July 2, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202609219115&New_Battle_Over_the_Future_of_Elder_Care_Arbitration_vs_Litigation.
81. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 264.
82. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 187; Palm, supra note 38, at 459.
83. Dollinger, supra note 80.
84. Palm, supra note 38, at 459.
85. WILLIAM A. KAPLAN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 74 (2007).
86. See Nan Aron, Leveling the Legal Playing Field: Limit Forced Arbitration,
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/
la-oe-aron-arbitration-contracts-instagram-20140114,0,397221 0.story#axzz2r5Jx 11
MO.
87. See Jessica Fargen, Nursing Home Residents Often Sign Away Rights to Sue, BOS. HERALD (Mar.
8, 2010), http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2010/03/nursing_home_residents_often_sign_away_rights_sue.
88. Sternlight, supra note 22, at 1654.
89. Sternlight, supra note 22, at 1654. The average recovery in arbitration is lower than the average
recovery in litigation. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38
U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 114-15 (2003).
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Notwithstanding the justifications for and against arbitration in nursing home
contracts, a court must determine the applicable law, if a valid agreement to arbitrate
exists, “and whether the specific dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.”90

IV. CHALLENGING MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN NURSING HOME
ADMISSION CONTRACTS
A.

Applicable Law and Contract Validity

As a preliminary matter, courts must determine what federal or state law governs the arbitration agreement.91 The FAA only applies to arbitration agreements
involving interstate commerce,92 and the Supreme Court has interpreted “interstate
commerce” broadly.93 The underlying admissions agreement at issue must involve
interstate commerce for the FAA to apply.94 Therefore, a nursing home’s interstate
activities determine whether the FAA governs arbitration agreements between nursing homes and residents.95
Courts have considered the receipt of materials from other states, treatment of
patients from other states, any out-of-state offices, and the receipt of Medicare funds
in determining whether the agreement involved “interstate commerce.” 96 In Dean
v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held that the nursing home residency contract implicated the FAA because “nursing
home residency contracts usually entail providing residents with meals and medical
90. Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., 31 F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 1994).
91. Suzanne M. Scheller, Arbitrating Wrongful Death Claims for Nursing Home Patients: What Is
Wrong with This Picture and How to Make It “More” Right, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 527, 536 (2008).
92. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
93. Paetzold v. Am. Sterling Corp., 247 S.W.3d 69, 72 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (describing “interstate
commerce” as functionally equivalent to “affecting commerce”); see also Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc.,
376 S.W.3d 581, 589 (Ky. 2012) (“Congress’s commerce power is interpreted broadly.”).
94. See Terminix Int’l, Inc. v. Rice, 904 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Miss. 2004) (applying the FAA to arbitration provisions in contracts involving commerce); Transouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d 1110, 1114
(Ala. 1999). (“The party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of proving the existence of a contract calling for arbitration and proving that that contract evidences a transaction affecting interstate
commerce.”).
95. See Cmty. Care of Am. of Ala., Inc. v. Davis, 850 So. 2d 283, 288–89 (Ala. 2002) (finding the
FAA did not apply because the nursing home’s activities were primarily intrastate, not interstate);
McGuffey Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. Jackson, 864 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Ala. 2003) (considered Medicare
funds moving across state lines to determine if an agreement substantially affects interstate commerce).
96. See also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329 (1991) (holding that purchase of outof-state medicines and acceptance of out-of-state insurance established interstate commerce); Briarcliff
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661, 668 (Ala. 2004) (finding nursing home admission contract substantially affected interstate commerce because owner of nursing home had regional office in
Florida, headquarters in Maryland, provided services to several patients from outside of Alabama, and
received regular shipments of supplies from other states); Triad Health Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 787–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (applying FAA to nursing home admission contract
because facility purchased supplies from out-of-state vendors, treated out-of-state patients, and had patients insured through Medicaid and Medicare); Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Lumpkin
ex rel. Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d 1092, 1095 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (holding FAA governed nursing home
admissions agreement because agreement evidenced economic activity affecting interstate commerce in
the aggregate); McIntosh v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001)
(finding arbitration agreement subject to FAA because employer treated out-of-state patients, received
goods and services from out-of-state vendors, and received reimbursement from out-of-state and multistate insurers, and employee’s position as drug counselor facilitated and affected employer’s business
activities).
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supplies that are inevitably shipped across state lines from out-of-state vendors.”97
Additionally, since the U.S. Supreme Court has held that health care is “a form of
economic activity involving interstate commerce, state and federal courts across the
country . . . have recognized that nursing home admission contracts are subject to
the FAA.”98
Since arbitration agreements are contracts,99 valid arbitration agreements “must
conform to the rules governing contracts.” 100 Therefore, courts must first determine
whether a valid contract exists before assessing the validity of the arbitration provision.101 In fact, the FAA requires the “party seeking to compel arbitration . . . [to
prove] the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate.”102 To prove a valid agreement to arbitrate existed, there must be proof of a valid contract. 103
State laws governing contract formation determine whether a valid contract exists.104 Generally, valid contracts require “(1) two or more contracting parties, (2)
consideration, (3) an agreement that is sufficiently definite, (4) parties with legal
capacity to make a contract, (5) mutual assent, and (6) no legal prohibition precluding contract formation.”105 Importantly, valid contracts require complete and voluntary assent to the contract terms by parties with the capacity to enter into a contract.106

97. Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 759 S.E.2d 727, 732 (2014).
98. Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306, 338 (Ky. 2015), as corrected (Oct. 9,
2015), reh’g denied (Feb. 18, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v.
Clark, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016). See, e.g., Cook v. GGNSC Ripley, LLC, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1166 (N.D.
Miss. 2011); Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 16; Barker v. Evangelical
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1266 (D.N.M. 2010); Estate of Eckstein ex rel.
Luckey v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (E.D. Wash. 2009); Triad Health
Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 788 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). See also Owens v. Coosa
Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 988 (Ala. 2004) (holding that a contract for nursing home
services involved interstate commerce); McGuffey Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. Gibson ex rel. Jackson, 864
So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Ala. 2003) (holding that a nursing home admissions agreement had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce because most of money and materials used to treat and care for a resident
came out-of-state sources and vendors). But see Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P’ship, 2006 OK 90,
¶ 42, 155 P.3d 16, 30-31 (holding a nursing home contract did not constitute interstate commerce because
the transactions involved, despite being economic activities, did not substantially impact interstate commerce when viewed in the aggregate, since the resident was from Oklahoma and the nursing home was
located in and licensed by Oklahoma).
99. Hogsett v. Parkwood Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2014)
(finding that “an arbitration agreement is still a contract”).
100. State ex rel. AMFM, LLC v. King, 740 S.E.2d 66, 73 (W. Va. 2013).
101. TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Rooks, 604 S.E.2d 562, 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
102. Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 590 (Ky. 2012).
103. See Byrd v. Simmons, 5 So. 3d 384, 388 (Miss. 2009) (citing Grenada Living Ctr., LLC, v. Coleman, 961 So. 2d 33, 36-37 (Miss. 2007)).
104. Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 590.
105. Grenada Living Ctr., LLC v. Coleman, 961 So. 2d 33, 37 (Miss. 2007); GGNSC Batesville, LLC
v. Johnson, 109 So. 3d 562, 565 (Miss. 2013) (quoting Adams Cmty. Care Ctr. , LLC v. Reed, 37 So. 3d
1155, 1158 (Miss. 2010)). See also Wallace v. Shreve Mem’l Library, 79 F.3d 427, 430 n.4 (5th Cir.
1996) (“Four elements are required for a valid contract: (1) the parties must possess the capacity to
contract; (2) the parties’ mutual consent must be freely given; (3) there must be a certain object for the
contract; and (4) the contract must have a lawful purpose.”); State ex rel. AMFM, LLC, 740 S.E.2d at 73
(“Accordingly, to be valid, the subject Arbitration Agreement must have (1) competent parties; (2) legal
subject matter; (3) valuable consideration; and (4) mutual assent.”).
106. Conners v. Eble, 269 S.W.2d 716, 717-18 (Ky. 1954).
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Challenges to Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Contracts

Courts that refused to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses in nursing home
admission contracts have relied on standard contract defenses to invalidate the
agreement, thus still complying with the FAA. 107 The most common challenges to
an arbitration agreement in a nursing home admission contract include signatory
issues, such as claims “that a signatory lacked the authority to commit his principal
[the resident], or that the signor lacked the mental capacity to assent.”108 Additionally, parties often argue that arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts are
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.109

1.

Lack of Capacity

Courts review arbitration agreements based on the applicable state law on contract formation.110 Since arbitration is a matter of a contract,111 valid arbitration
agreements require mutual assent by competent parties with “capacity to contract.”112 Lack of capacity is a “general defense to any contract formation,” so the
laws of the state governing the contract will determine the availability of this defense.113
Generally, a party lacks capacity to contract if he or she lacks “sufficient mental
capacity to understand the nature and effect of the particular transaction.” 114 A party
has capacity to contract if he or she has the “ability to understand in a meaningful

107. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 188.
108. Wiand v. Schneiderman, 778 F.3d 917, 924 (11th Cir. 2015).
109. Bates & Still, Jr., supra note 38, at 285; Gallagher, supra note 71, at 194.
110. Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2007).
111. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
112. Conners v. Eble, 269 S.W.2d 716, 717-18 (Ky. 1954). See also Farrar v. United States, 30 U.S.
373, 378 (1831) (“To make a valid contract, the party must not only have a capacity to contract, but the
means of exercising that capacity by expressing their assent to its stipulations.”); Wallace v. Shreve
Mem’l Library, 79 F.3d 427, 430 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Louisiana law, valid contracts require
“(1) the parties must possess the capacity to contract; (2) the parties’ mutual consent must be freely
given; (3) there must be a certain object for the contract; and (4) the contract must have a lawful purpose.”); Wilkerson ex rel. Estate of Wilkerson v. Nelson, 395 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286 (M.D.N.C. 2005)
(applying North Carolina law, a valid contract “requires offer, acceptance, consideration, mutual assent,
and the presence of no valid defenses for contract formation.”); Pine Hills Health & Rehab., LLC v.
Matthews, 431 S.W.3d 910, 915 (Ark. 2014) (“The essential elements of a contract are competent parties,
subject matter, legal consideration, mutual agreement, and mutual obligations.”); Grenada Living Ctr.,
LLC v. Coleman, 961 So. 2d 33, 37 (Miss. 2007) (applying Mississippi law, valid contracts require
mutual assent between two or more parties with the legal capacity to make contracts).
113. Rowan v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-1261, 2015 WL 9906264, at *4
(W.D. Mich. June 1, 2015). See infra notes 101-23 and accompanying text.
114. McElroy v. Mathews, 263 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Mo. 1953). See also Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250
N.E.2d 460, 464 (N.Y. 1969) (finding incapacity to contract when a party is “wholly and absolutely
incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction.”) (quoting Aldrich v. Bailey,
30 N.E. 264, 265 (N.Y. 1892)); Shippers Exp. v. Chapman, 364 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Miss. 1978) (applying Mississippi law, the test for mental competency is whether, at the time of contract execution, a party’s
“mind [is] so unsound, or . . . so weak in mind, or so imbecile, no matter from what cause, that he cannot
manage the ordinary affairs of life.”).
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way, at the time the contract is executed, the nature, scope and effect of the contract.”115
However, parties to a contract are presumed competent and capable of understanding the nature and effect of his or her actions. 116 A party arguing “that an entire
contract containing an arbitration provision is unenforceable because [the signor]
lacked the mental capacity to enter into the contract” 117 bears the burden of proving
incapacity.118 Proof of incapacity depends on the facts regarding a party’s mental
condition at the time he or she executed the contract. 119
In Landers v. Integrated Health Services of Shreveport, a Louisiana court held
that the nursing home resident lacked capacity at the time she signed the arbitration
agreement since the resident’s nursing home medical records demonstrated that the
resident required 24-hour professional nursing supervision and was forgetful, depressed, and suffering from schizophrenia. 120 The court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement because the nursing home knew about the resident’s lack of
capacity at the time she signed the arbitration agreement because the nursing home
had a duty to conduct neurological and cognitive assessment when she was admitted.121
Similarly, a Mississippi district court concluded that a nursing home resident
lacked mental capacity to enter into an arbitration agreement. 122 Applying Mississippi law, the court determined that at the time the resident signed the agreement,
he lacked the capacity to “manage the ordinary affairs of life,” such as making coherent decisions regarding “important personal, business, and life” matters.123 Spe-

115. Gaddy v. Douglass, 597 S.E.2d 12, 20 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004). See also Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 464
(defining capacity to contract as the ability to make “a rational judgment concerning the particular transaction.”); Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157, 160 (10th Cir. 1967) (“[M]ental capacity to contract
depends upon whether the allegedly disabled person possessed sufficient reason to enable him to understand the nature and effect of the act in issue.”); Bitler Inv. Venture II, LLC v. Marathon Ashland Petro.,
LLC, 779 F. Supp. 2d 858, 883 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that capacity to contract requires a person to
understand the nature and effect of his or her act on the date of the agreement).
116. See, e.g., Simmons First Nat’l Bank v. Luzader, 438 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Ark. 1969) (“There is a presumption of law that every man is sane, fully competent and capable of understanding the nature and
effect of his contracts.”); Feiden v. Feiden, 542 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (“A party’s
competence is presumed and the party asserting incapacity bears the burden of proving incompetence.”).
117. Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003).
118. See Feiden, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 862 (“[T]he party asserting incapacity bears the burden of proving
incompetence.”); Dalon v. Ruleville Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. 415CV00086DMBJMV, 2016
WL 498432, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 8, 2016) (holding that party asserting mental incapacity must prove
incapacity by a “preponderance of proof”); Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d
291, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“[P]ersons seeking to invalidate a contract for mental incapacity have
the burden of proving that one or both of the contracting parties were mentally incompetent when the
contract was formed.”).
119. Bitler Inv. Venture II, LLC, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 883 (holding that capacity to enter into a contract
requires a person to understand the nature and effect of his or her act on the date of the agreement). See
also Cmty. Care Ctr. of Vicksburg, LLC v. Mason, 966 So. 2d 220, 230-31 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (finding a valid arbitration agreement existed because no evidence suggested resident lacked capacity to enter
into a contract at the time she signed the arbitration clause); Brown v. United Mo. Bank, N.A., 78 F.3d
382, 386 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Evidence of the person’s mental condition before and after execution can be
sufficient if it provides a reasonable inference of incompetency at the time of execution.”).
120. Landers v. Integrated Health Servs. of Shreveport, 39,739, p. 3-4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/11/05), 903
So. 2d 609, 612.
121. Id.
122. Liberty Health & Rehab of Indianola, LLC v. Howarth, 11 F. Supp. 3d 684, 688 (N.D. Miss. 2014).
123. Id. at 687.
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cifically, testimony that the resident “was unable, on the date he signed the arbitration agreement, to state what year it was, within five years” evidenced “a profound
diminishment of mental capacity and a significant disconnect from reality.” 124 As
a result, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration because of the resident’s
lack of competency.125
In contrast, a Mississippi state court held that a resident with schizophrenia had
the necessary legal capacity to contract because he had a wife and children and
managed his own money, hired an attorney to file lawsuits, and testified “coherently
and competently at his discovery depositions.” 126 In Estate of Etting v. Regents
Park at Aventura, Inc., the District Court of Appeals of Florida found that a nursing
home resident’s legal blindness at the time she signed the agreement did not render
her incapable of assenting to the agreement.127
When a resident signs a nursing home admission contract containing an arbitration provision, raising an incapacity defense may prevent arbitration of any later
claims.128 A district court in Florida denied a motion to compel arbitration because
the decedent did not understand the contracts she signed during the admission process into a nursing facility.129 The decedent was Vera Gilmore, an 87-year old
woman with Alzheimer’s-related dementia, confusion, and delusions. 130 Ms. Gilmore signed an agreement to arbitrate included in the admission paperwork upon
her arrival at a nursing home.131 Given Ms. Gilmore’s “age, physical ailments, history of dementia, confusion and disorientation, as well as her consistent use of antipsychotic medication,” the court held that she lacked the mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of the contracts she signed.132 As a result, the arbitration
agreement was unenforceable.133
Like Ms. Gilmore, many nursing home residents suffer from some kind of
physical or mental impairments that prevent them from actually understanding and
assenting to the terms of an admission contract or arbitration agreement.134 However, neither Alzheimer’s nor dementia establishes a presumption of incompetency.135 Rather, “the person with the burden of proof must establish, in light of all
the surrounding facts and circumstances, that the cognitive impairment or disease
rendered the contracting party incompetent to engage in the transaction at issue . . .
124. Id.
125. Id. at 688.
126. Brumfield v. Lowe, 744 So. 2d 383, 387 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
127. Estate of Etting v. Regents Part at Aventura, Inc., 891 So. 2d 558, 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
128. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.
129. Gilmore v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., No. 2:10–cv–99–FtM–29DNF, 2010 WL 3944653, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Oct. 7, 2010). The court applied the FAA because the case involved an arbitration agreement contained in the admission contract of a nursing home located in Florida but was owned and operated by a
Tennessee company, the issue involved commerce “within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 2.” Id. at *2.
130. Id. at *1.
131. Id. The decedent’s son had power of attorney for his mother but did not “participate in the intake
process” at the nursing facility. Id.
132. Id. at *4.
133. Id.
134. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 189. See also Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 64 P.2d
605, 607 (Wyo. 1937).
135. In re Mildred M.J., 844 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Gala v. Magarinos, 665
N.Y.S.2d 95, 96 (App. Div. 1997)). See also Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 168 P.2d 256, 260 (Colo.
1946) (holding that senile dementia is not conclusive of lack of capacity to contract); Kaleb, 64 P.2d at
607 (“A condition which may be described by a physician as senile dementia may not be insanity in a
legal sense.”).
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.”136 Nevertheless, a resident’s dementia or Alzheimer’s disease may be severe
enough to render an individual incapable of possessing contractual capacity, especially if they are “chronic and progressive in nature.” 137 Many nursing home residents suffer from physical or mental limitations, or both, because of old age and
disease.138 As such, whenever a resident signs a nursing home admission contract
on his or her own behalf, courts should be aware that lack of capacity is a common
defense to motions to compel arbitration.

2. Lack of Authority
Valid arbitration agreements require assent by competent parties. 139 Without
assent by competent parties in arbitration agreements, “courts have no authority to
mandate that [parties arbitrate disputes].” 140 Parties signing an arbitration agreement are “competent” if they have the authority to do so.141 Additionally, “[a]ssent
to be bound by the terms of an agreement must be expressed.”142 One way to express assent to an arbitration provision is through a signature by the parties. 143
However, if a resident lacks mental capacity to enter into a contract 144 or is
otherwise unable to sign the arbitration agreement, a friend, family member, or personal representative of the resident may sign the agreement on the resident’s behalf.145 In such circumstances, a common challenge to enforcement of arbitration
“is that the arbitration agreement should not be enforced because it was not signed
by the nursing home resident him- or herself, but rather, by a relative or other representative.”146
If the resident does not sign the arbitration agreement, principles of agency and
contract law may force the resident to arbitrate future claims against the nursing
home.147 “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests
136. Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
137. See Gaddy v. Douglass, 597 S.E.2d 12, 21 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).
138. Kaleb, 64 P.2d at 607.
139. State ex rel. AMFM, LLC v. King, 740 S.E.2d 66, 73 (W. Va. 2013).
140. Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995).
141. State ex rel. AMFM, LLC, 740 S.E.2d at 73.
142. Ally Cat, LLC v. Chauvin, 274 S.W.3d 451, 456 (Ky. 2009).
143. See McInnis v. Se. Automatic Sprinkler Co., 233 So. 2d 219, 221 (Miss. 1970) (“The object of a
signature is to show mutuality or assent . . . .”). See also Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 159 Ohio
App. 3d 66, 72, 2004-Ohio-5757, 823 N.E.2d 19, at ¶ 25 (6th Dist.) (“[B]y signing the agreement, the
parties agree to arbitrate their disputes and that the parties agree to the terms of the agreement.”).
144. See supra notes 103-30 and accompanying text.
145. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 189. See also Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d
217, 226 (W. Va. 2012) (“Many contracts for admission are signed by a . . . family member in a tense
and bewildering setting.”).
146. John R. Schleppenbach, Something Old, Something New: Recent Developments in the Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate Disputes Between Nursing Homes and their Residents, 22 ELDER L.J.
141, 154 (2014).
147. Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 359 F.3d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 2004) (“A party, however, can be
compelled to arbitrate under an agreement, even if he or she did not sign that agreement, if common law
principles of agency and contract support such an obligation on his or her part.”); Thomson-CSF, S.A.
v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Traditional principles of agency law may
bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement.”).
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assent or otherwise consents so to act.”148 The party claiming agency must prove
the existence and scope of the agency relationship.149 Proving an agency relationship exists requires extrinsic evidence because courts typically do not infer an
agency relationship between family members or whenever one person acts on behalf of another.150
In an agency relationship, the agent’s actions legally bind the principal 151 only
if the agent’s actions are within the scope of his or her authority. 152 Principals are
responsible for their agent’s acts and agreements that are within the scope of the
agent’s authority.153 Statements made by an agent bind the principal if the statement
falls within the scope of the agent’s authority. 154 “Authority is the power of the
agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with
the principal’s manifestations of consent to him.” 155 The resident’s agent must have
either actual authority, which may be express or implied, or apparent authority to
sign the arbitration agreement on behalf of the resident.156

i.

Actual Authority

Actual authority exists “when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the
principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to
act.”157 Actual authority occurs when the principal expressly or implicitly gives an
agent authority.158
Evidence of actual authority requires proof that the principal has specifically
granted the agent the power to bind the principal.159 Proof of actual authority stems

148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
149. Bluehaven Funding, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1055, 1059 (8th Cir. 2010); Tex.
Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345, 352 (Tex. App. 2007).
150. Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC, 2015 PA Super 189, 124 A.3d 317, 323 (Pa. 2015).
151. Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 735 (Md. 2010).
152. Peninsula Land Co. v. Howard, 6 So. 2d 384, 388 (Fla. 1941); see also Stalley v. Transitional
Hosps. Corp. of Tampa, Inc., 44 So. 3d 627, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he scope of the agent’s
authority is limited to what the principal has authorized the agent to do.”); Bluehaven, 594 F.3d at 1058
(“A principal is responsible for its agents’ acts and agreements that are within the agent’s authority,
whether the authority is actual or apparent.”) (quoting Motorsport Mktg., Inc. v. Wiedmaier, Inc., 195
S.W.3d 492, 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)).
153. Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 851 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
154. P. Flanigan & Sons v. Childs, 248 A.2d 473, 477 (Md. 1968) (“[A] statement made by an agent
will not bind his principal until an agency is established and then only if the statement is within the scope
of the agency . . . .”).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (AM. LAW. INST. 1957).
156. AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 1987) (“An agent whose authority has
been granted either expressly or by implication possesses actual authority to act on behalf of the principal.”). Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A]ctual authority takes two forms: (1)
express authority, and (2) authority that is implied or incidental to a grant of express authority.”); Lind
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 84 (3d Cir. 1960); (“The term ‘implied authority’ is often seen but
most authorities consider ‘implied authority’ to be merely a sub-group of ‘actual’ authority.”); Curto v.
Illini Manors, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 233, 235 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Bates & Still, Jr., supra note 38, at
283.
157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006).
158. Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1960).
159. See U.S. v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1991).
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from “the principal’s manifestations to the agent.” 160 It is the principal’s words or
conduct, not the agent’s, which establish actual authority. 161 Also, the principal’s
knowing acquiescence to the agent’s actions may establish actual authority. 162
However, a mere familial relationship between the resident and the signor does
not create an agency relationship.163 Absent extrinsic evidence, “a spouse or other
family member [does] not have actual authority to sign an arbitration agreement on
the resident’s behalf.”164
There are two kinds of actual authority: express and implied. The first kind of
actual authority is express authority.165 Express authority exists “when the principal
explicitly tells the agent what to do.”166 The principal’s conduct or words, written
or spoken, creates express authority. 167 The scope of express authority “extends
only to the powers the principal confers upon the agent.” 168
A written contract, power of attorney, 169 or court-ordered guardianship170 may
establish express authority. “Powers of attorney are strictly construed.” 171 As such,
powers of attorneys grant only the explicit powers specified that the principal intended to convey.172 In other words, “an agent’s authority under a power of attorney
is to be construed with reference to the types of transaction expressly authorized in
the document and subject always to the agent’s duty to act with the ‘utmost good
faith.’”173
Additionally, a “durable power of attorney constitutes a grant of express authority per its terms.”174 A durable power of attorney creates an agency relationship
160. Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 851 S.W.2d 657, 661-62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); see also
AgriStor, 826 F.2d at 737 (“A determination of an express or implied agency focuses on communications
and contacts between the principal and the agent.”).
161. Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 231 F.3d 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 2000). See also Schaffart v.
ONEOK, Inc., 686 F.3d 461, 471 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Whether express or implied, actual authority requires
action by the principal.”).
162. Essco Geometric v. Harvard Indus., 46 F.3d 718, 723 (8th Cir. 1995); Anderson v. Gen. Cas., 935
A.2d 746, 752 (Md. 2007).
163. Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC, 2015 PA Super 189, 124 A.3d 317, 323 (Pa. 2015)
(“Agency cannot be inferred from mere relationships or family ties, and we do not assume agency merely
because one person acts on behalf of another.”).
164. Curto v. Illini Manors, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 234 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
165. See Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 851 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“Actual
authority may be express or implied.”).
166. Id. at 661; Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 376 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2004).
167. Harris v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 437 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Turner
v. Burlington N. R. Co., 771 F.2d 341, 345 (8th Cir. 1985)).
168. Curto. 940 N.E.2d at 233.
169. Moffett v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 187 P.3d 1140, 1144 (Colo. App. 2008) (“[T]he execution of a
power of attorney creates a principal-agent relationship.”), aff’d, 219 P.3d 1068 (Colo. 2009); Matter of
Trust of Franzen, 955 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Colo. 1998) (“A power of attorney is an instrument by which a
principal confers express authority on an agent to perform certain acts or kinds of acts on the principal’s
behalf.”); Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 591 (Ky. 2012) (“A power of attorney is a
written, often formally acknowledged, manifestation of the principal’s intent to enter into such a relationship with a designated agent.”).
170. Curto. 940 N.E.2d at 233; see also Bates & Still, Jr., supra note 38, at 283 (“A resident may grant
express or actual authority to act on his or her behalf pursuant to verbal express authority, power of
attorney (“POA”), durable power of attorney (“DPOA”), or court appointment as guardian or conservator
for the resident.”).
171. Kotsch v. Kotsch, 608 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
172. Id.
173. Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 592.
174. Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC, 124 A.3d 317, 323-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/10

16

Alper: Seeking Justice for Grandma: Challenging Mandatory Arbitration in

No. 2]

Seeking Justice for Grandma

485

“that would continue beyond the principal’s incapacity.” 175 Every state has adopted
legislation allowing for durable powers of attorney. 176
However, power of attorney to make medical or health care decisions grants
authority to admit principals into a nursing home but not authority to sign an arbitration agreement on the principal’s behalf. 177 For example, “the intermediate appellate courts in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Texas have concluded that the authority to make health care decisions on another’s behalf does not constitute authority to sign an arbitration agreement on that person’s behalf.” 178
In addition, other courts “have recently concluded that the decision to sign an
arbitration agreement was not a health care decision, and they based that decision
on the fact that signing the arbitration agreement was not a prerequisite to admission
to a health care facility.”179 Specifically, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that
a nursing home could not compel arbitration against the daughter of a resident, individually or as personal representative of resident’s estate, because “signing the
arbitration provision was not a part of the consideration necessary for . . . admission
to [the nursing home],” and because the daughter “did not have the authority . . . to
enter into the arbitration provision contained within the admissions agreement.” 180
Moreover, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a nursing home resident’s
son had actual authority “to sign the required admission papers.” 181 However, the
son did not have actual authority to sign an arbitration agreement “that would waive
[the resident’s] right of access to the courts and to trial by jury” because the arbitration agreement “was optional and was not required for [the resident] to remain at
the facility.”182
In another case, a Maryland court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement
signed by an agent of the resident; even though the signor of the admission agreement was the resident’s agent for purposes of making financial and health care decisions. The court held that the scope of that agency relationship did not include
the authority to bind the principal to the arbitration agreement. 183

175. Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 591.
176. Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship: Lessons We Have Learned,
37 STETSON L. REV. 7 (2007).
177. See Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 736-38 (Md. 2010). See also Curto v. Illini Manors,
Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“[A] health care power of attorney granted for medical
decisions does not confer authority to sign an arbitration agreement waiving legal rights.”); Life Care
Ctrs. of Am. v. Smith, 681 S.E.2d 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (power of attorney granted to daughter for
medical decisions did not grant authority to waive legal rights under arbitration agreement); Lujan v.
Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 222 P.3d 970, 973-76 (Colo. App. 2009) (agreeing with other jurisdictions that
have concluded that “a health care proxy’s decision to agree to arbitrate is [not] a medical treatment
decision”); Tex. Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345, 352-53 (Tex. App. 2007)
(“[N]othing in the medical power of attorney indicates that it was intended to confer authority . . . to
make legal, as opposed to health care, decisions . . . such as whether to waive [the] right to a jury trial
by agreeing to arbitration of any disputes.”); Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296,
301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (“There is nothing in the [health care proxy] statute to indicate legislative
intent that such a proxy can enter into contracts which agree to things not strictly related to health care
decisions. In our opinion, a proxy is not authorized to waive the right to trial by jury. . . .”).
178. Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 737 (Md. 2010). See supra note 172 and accompanying
text.
179. Dickerson, 995 A.2d at 738.
180. Miss. Care Ctr. of Greenville, LLC v. Hinyub, 975 So. 2d 211, 218 (Miss. 2008).
181. Koricic v. Beverly Enters.—Neb., Inc., 773 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Neb. 2009).
182. Id.; Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775, 786-87 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
183. Dickerson, 995 A.2d at 735.
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In contrast, an appellate court in New Mexico held that the granddaughter of a
nursing home resident had actual and apparent authority to complete the admission
paperwork on the resident’s behalf. The court stated that the granddaughter had the
authority to sign the optional arbitration agreement contained in the admission paperwork because the arbitration agreement was “considered an admission document
and that accepting or rejecting arbitration [was] part of the admission process.” 184
On the other hand, several courts have held that a health-care power of attorney
includes the authority to enter into an arbitration agreement. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that “an attorney-in-fact acting pursuant to a durable power of
attorney for health care may sign a nursing-home contract that contains an arbitration provision because this action is necessary to ‘consent to health care.’” 185 Similarly, a Georgia appellate court found a valid and enforceable arbitration provision
in a nursing home admission contract signed by the resident’s son who had express
authority to act on his father’s behalf because of a general power of attorney. 186
The second kind of actual authority is implied authority, or “actual authority
circumstantially proved.”187 Implied authority exists when the principal’s conduct,
reasonably interpreted, leads the agent to believe that the principal wants the agent
to act on his or her behalf.188 Implied authority is authority “intended by the principal, or would be if the principal thought about it.” 189 It comes from “powers incidental and necessary to carry out the express authority.” 190 Implied authority includes authority “either to (1) do what is necessary to accomplish the agent’s express responsibilities or (2) act in a manner that the agent reasonably believes the
principal wishes the agent to act, in light of the principal’s objectives and manifestations.”191
Proof of implied authority may come “from the circumstances of a case based
on prior course of dealing of a similar nature between the alleged agent and principal or from a previous agency relationship.”192 Additionally, implied authority may
be proven by the facts and circumstances of a particular case, as well as both parties’
words and conduct.193 An Illinois court found no evidence of implied authority to
bind the resident when the agent signed the arbitration agreement in the admissions
contract because the resident was absent when the agent signed the arbitration
agreement and did not direct the agent to sign the agreement as the resident’s representative.194 Additionally, there was no evidence that the resident knew that the
184. Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 265 P.3d 720, 726 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011).
185. Owens v. Nat’l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876, 884 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. §
34-6-201(3) (West 2015)).
186. Triad Health Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (power
of attorney gave resident’s son “full power and authority to do and perform all and every act . . . necessary, requisite or proper to be done, as fully . . . as I might or could do if personally present,” without
specific limitations).
187. Curto v. Illini Manors, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
188. Id.; Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775, 781 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
189. Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1994).
190. Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 851 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Essco Geometric
v. Harvard Indus., 46 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1995).
191. Koricic v. Beverly Enters.—Neb., Inc., 773 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Neb. 2009).
192. Curto v. Illini Manors, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). See also Essco, 46 F.3d at
724 (“Missouri case law suggests that custom and the relations of the parties establish the parameters of
implied actual authority.”).
193. Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775, 781 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008).
194. Curto, 940 N.E.2d at 233.
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agent signed the arbitration agreement and agreed to or adopted her signature as his
own.195

ii.

Apparent Authority

Absent actual authority, an agent can bind a principal if the agent has apparent
authority.196 Apparent authority “is the power held by an agent or other actor to
affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably
believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is
traceable to the principal’s manifestations.” 197 Apparent authority exists when the
principal’s actions “convey the impression to a third party that an agent has certain
powers which he may or may not actually possess.” 198 Apparent authority is authority that “has been knowingly permitted by the principal or which the principal
holds the agent out as possessing.”199
To establish apparent authority, there must be “evidence that a principal has
communicated directly with the third party or has knowingly permitted its agent to
exercise authority.”200 It exists when “certain acts or manifestations by the alleged
principal to a third party lead[] the third party to believe that an agent had authority
to act.”201 The three-pronged test for recovery under apparent authority “requires a
showing of (1) acts or conduct of the principal indicating the agent’s authority, (2)
reasonable reliance upon those acts by a third person, and (3) a detrimental change
in position by the third person as a result of that reliance.” 202 “[D]irect communication from the principal to a third party causing that third party to reasonably believe that a person has authority to act for the principal” creates apparent authority.203 The communication can be nonverbal, such as through “a combination of
actions by the principal, or manifestations that the principal allows to be made without objection.204 Finally, there must be proof that the apparent agent acted within
the scope of his or her authority, since “an apparent principal is bound by an apparent agent’s acts only if that agent is acting within the scope of his apparent authority.”205
A New Mexico court found an agent had apparent authority to bind a principal
to an arbitration agreement.206 In that case, a nursing home resident, gave her granddaughter permission to complete admission paperwork on her behalf, including an
arbitration agreement.207 The court looked to the reasonableness of the nursing
home’s reliance on the granddaughter’s representation of authority in considering
195. Id.
196. Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 735 (Md. 2010).
197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
198. Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1960).
199. Agristor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 1987).
200. Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 851 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993).
201. Klein v. Weiss, 395 A.2d 126, 140 (Md. 1978).
202. Eaton v. Porter, 645 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (Miss. 1994); see also Alexander v. Chandler, 179 S.W.3d
385, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“The three elements required to make a prima facie showing of apparent
authority stated above can be reduced to: (1) consent by the principal to the exercise of the authority; (2)
good faith reliance by a third party; and (3) damage sustained.”).
203. Alexander, 179 S.W.3d at 388.
204. Id.
205. Gentry v. Beverly Enters.-Ga., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1230 (S.D. Ga. 2009).
206. Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 265 P.3d 720, 726 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011).
207. Id. at 722.
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the scope of the granddaughter’s apparent authority. 208 The court concluded that
the granddaughter had apparent authority to bind the grandmother to the arbitration
provision because the grandmother had communicated the granddaughter’s authority to the social services director who handled admissions. 209
An Alabama court took a more relaxed approach to apparent authority, finding
apparent authority “where the principal passively permits the agent to appear to a
third person to have the authority to act on [her] behalf.” 210 The brother of a resident
signed the admission contract and arbitration agreement on his sister’s behalf as an
“authorized representative.”211 Although the power of attorney did not exist when
the brother signed the arbitration provision, the court still found a valid arbitration
agreement existed because there was “no evidence indicating that [the resident] had
any objection to [her brother’s] acting on her behalf in admitting [the resident] to
the nursing home. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that [the resident] approved of her brother’s acting on her behalf.” 212 In fact, a few weeks into the resident’s stay at the nursing home, she executed a power of attorney, giving her brother
authority to act on her behalf. 213
On the other hand, a Texas court found that a nursing home resident’s wife
lacked apparent authority to sign an arbitration agreement on the resident’s behalf.214 The court noted the lack of evidence that the resident acted “to induce the
belief that [his wife] was his agent. In fact, there is no evidence he was even present
when the form was signed.”215 The court found that the nursing home resident was
not bound by the arbitration agreement because the wife lacked apparent authority
to sign on her husband’s behalf, rendering the agreement invalid. 216
Similarly, a California court found that two daughters who signed an arbitration
agreement on behalf of their comatose and mentally incompetent mother lacked
apparent authority to bind their mother to the agreement. 217 The court reasoned that
even though the daughters signed the agreement, there was no apparent authority
because there was no “evidence [that the] comatose and mentally incompetent
woman did anything which caused [the nursing home] to believe either of her
daughters was authorized to act as her agent in any capacity.” 218 Importantly, the
court noted that “[a] person cannot become the agent of another merely by representing herself as such.”219 Rather, agency requires the principal to cause a third
party to believe someone was his or her agent, even if the principal does not employ
the agent expressly.220
Generally, most courts reject apparent authority theories to bind signors of arbitration agreements in nursing home admission contracts. 221 Courts in California,
Texas, Mississippi, and Georgia have all refused to find to apparent authority even
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Id. at 725.
Id. at 726. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Courtesy Auto Brokers, Inc., 426 So. 2d 859, 861 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983).
Carraway v. Beverly Enters. Ala., Inc., 978 So. 2d 27, 30 (Ala. 2007).
Id. at 31.
Id.
Sikes v. Heritage Oaks W. Ret. Vill., 238 S.W.3d 807, 810 (Tex. App. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Pagarigan v. Libby Care Ctr., Inc. 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 894-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 895.
Id. at 894.
Id.
See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
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when the signor was a relative of the resident. 222 When attempting to dispute the
validity or enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a nursing home contract, a
claim of apparent authority may be easily refuted by the evidence and requires an
intense investigation of the facts.223

1.

Third-Party Beneficiary

Third-party beneficiary theory is an exception to the general rule of contract
law that only parties (signatories) to a contract are bound by or may enforce its
provisions.224 Nonsignatories are bound by an arbitration agreement in a contract
if they are third-party beneficiaries.225 A third-party beneficiary is someone that the
parties to the contract intended to benefit.226 If performance of the contract directly
results in a benefit to a nonsignatory and such benefit was “within the contemplation
of the parties as shown by its terms,” the nonsignatory is a third-party beneficiary.227
Thus, the intent of the parties at the time of contract execution and the terms of the
contract determine if a third-party beneficiary exists.228 Specifically, the contract
must evince “the express or implied intention to benefit the party, [and also] an
intention to benefit the party directly.”229 However, if the contract terms lack an
express statement of the intent to benefit a third party, “there is a strong presumption
that the third party is not a beneficiary and that the parties contracted to benefit only

222. See, e.g., Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, 2005-CA-02199-COA (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App.
2007) (noting that even though nursing home resident’s son acted as if he had the authority to bind his
mother, the principal’s acts or conduct must prove the agent’s authority); Ashburn Health Care Ctr., Inc.
v. Poole, 648 S.E.2d 430, 432-33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the nursing home resident did not
authorize her husband to act as her agent when he signed the arbitration agreement in an admission
contract because the resident’s son had durable power of attorney for his mother but he did not sign the
agreement, despite being present during the signing); Tex. Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d
345, 353-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that what matters is the actions of the principal, not the agent,
and that the principal was not even present when her daughter signed the admissions agreement).
223. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 190.
224. Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 595 (Ky. 2012). “For a third-party beneficiary to
exist, there must first exist a valid contract executed by one with ‘legal capacity’ to enter the contract.”
Adams Cmty. Care Ctr., LLC v. Reed, 2009-CA-00730-SCT (¶ 16) (Miss. 2010).
225. Grenada Living Ctr., LLC v. Coleman, 2006–CA–00169–SCT (¶ 16) (Miss. 2007); Alterra
Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So. 2d 574, 579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
226. Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 741-42 (Md. 2010) (quoting Shillman v. Hobstetter, 241
A.2d 570, 575 (Md. 1968) (“An individual is a third-party beneficiary to a contract if ‘the contract was
intended for his [or her] benefit’ and ‘it . . . clearly appear[s] that the parties intended to recognize him
[or her] as the primary party in interest and as privy to the promise.’”)).
227. Burns v. Wash. Sav., 171 So. 2d 322, 325 (Miss. 1965). The promisee must have a duty or legal
obligation to the third party that connects the third party to the contract. Id.
228. Burns v. Wash. Sav., 171 So. 2d 322, 325 (Miss. 1965).
229. Glass v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001). See JP Morgan Chase & Co. v.
Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2007). See also McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 362
(1st Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (“Because third-party beneficiary status constitutes an exception to the
general rule that a contract does not grant enforceable rights to nonsignatories, a person aspiring to such
status must show with special clarity that the contracting parties intended to confer a benefit on him.”);
Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Dunn, 194 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Mo. 2006), as modified on denial of reh’g (June 30,
2006) (“To be bound as a third-party beneficiary, the terms of the contract must clearly express intent to
benefit that party or an identifiable class of which the party is a member.”).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

21

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2016, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 10

490

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2016

themselves.”230 An incidental benefit to a third party does not create a third-party
beneficiary.231
If the resident does not sign the arbitration agreement, states differ in determining whether the resident is an intended third-party beneficiary. For example, when
a nursing home resident’s wife signed an arbitration agreement in representative
capacity, a Pennsylvania court held that the “resident could not be an intended thirdparty beneficiary to a contract to which he was ostensibly a party.”232 Similarly, the
District Court of New Mexico noted that a nursing home resident was not a thirdparty beneficiary of the arbitration provision.233 Although the resident was a thirdparty beneficiary of the admission contract, the court reasoned that the resident’s
“consent to arbitrate was not required for admission,” and the arbitration agreement
was not intended to benefit the resident.”234
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a nursing home resident
was bound by an arbitration provision in a nursing home admission contract as nonsignatory third-party beneficiary of agreement.235 Although the resident’s mother
signed the contract on the resident’s behalf, the contract intended to benefit the resident since it named him “as the resident receiving care and services from the nursing home.”236 As a result, the court found that contract expresses clearly the parties’
intent to make the resident a beneficiary of the contract. 237
Moreover, courts are split regarding the binding effect of arbitration provisions
on the resident’s wrongful-death heirs or representatives. 238 In states where the
wrongful death statute “is wholly derivative of and dependent on” claims that the
decedent could have brought,239 courts are more likely to consider the wrongful
death plaintiffs – the decedent’s heirs – as third-party beneficiaries bound by the
arbitration provision in the contract. 240 For instance, the Alabama Supreme Court
230. Nitro Distrib., Inc., 194 S.W.3d at 345.
231. Id. See also E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates,
S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Thus, if it was not the promisee’s intention to confer direct
benefits upon a third party, but rather such third party happens to benefit from the performance of the
promise either coincidentally or indirectly, then the third party will have no enforceable rights under the
contract.”).
232. Washburn v. N. Health Facilities, Inc., 2015 PA Super 168, 121 A.3d 1008, 1016.
233. Barker v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1268-69 (D.N.M.
2010).
234. Id. at 1269.
235. JP Morgan Chase & Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2007).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Spradlin, 532 F. App’x 813, 817-18 (10th Cir. 2013); Scheller,
supra note 91, at 546.
239. Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ¶ 23, 189 P.3d 40.
240. Spradlin, 532 F. App’x at 817 (quoting Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, 2005–CA–
02199–COA (¶ 27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)) (“We conclude that in New Mexico, a wrongful-death claim
derives directly from the claim possessed by the decedent, had he or she lived. . . . a ‘wrongful-death
suit is a derivative action by the beneficiaries, and those beneficiaries, therefore, stand in the position of
their decedent.’”); Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752, 761–62 (Fla. 2013) (“[T]he
nature of a wrongful death cause of action in Florida is derivative in the context of determining whether
a decedent’s estate and heirs are bound by the decedent’s agreement to arbitrate. The estate and heirs
stand in the shoes of the decedent for purposes of whether the defendant is liable and are bound by the
decedent’s actions and contracts with respect to defenses and releases.”); In re Labatt Food Serv., LP,
279 S.W.3d 640, 646 (Tex. 2009) (“[R]egardless of the fact that [decedent’s] beneficiaries are seeking
compensation for their own personal loss, they still stand in [decedent’s] legal shoes and are bound by
his agreement.”); Barber, 2005–CA–02199–COA (¶ 27) (“Because Ms. Barber’s claims would have
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held that personal representatives (an executor and an administratrix) of nursing
home residents’ estates were bound by the arbitration agreement entered into by the
decedent.241 An executor and administratix have all the same powers and limitations of the decedent, so by bringing wrongful death claims on behalf of the decedents, they were bound by the arbitration provisions contained in the admission
contract just as the decedents would have been.242
When the wrongful death cause of action is new or independent from any
causes of action that the decedent could bring, courts are more likely to hold that
heirs to the decedent’s estate are not third-party beneficiaries and therefore are not
bound to the arbitration agreement.243 For example, the Utah Supreme Court held
that “a decedent does not have the power to contract away the wrongful death action
of his heirs.”244 In Utah, “a wrongful death cause of action, while derivative in the
sense that it will not lie without a viable underlying personal injury claim, is a separate claim.”245 Since the wrongful death plaintiff was not an intended beneficiary
of the admission contract, she was not a third-party beneficiary and could not be
bound by the arbitration agreement.246
Similarly, in a Pennsylvania case, a resident’s contractual agreement with a
nursing home to arbitrate all claims was not binding on the nonsignatory wrongful
death claimants because the wrongful death cause of action was an independent

been subject to arbitration, the claims of her wrongful death beneficiaries are likewise subject the arbitration provision.”); Ballard v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 327 N.W.2d 370, 371–72 (Mich. 1982) (“[A]lthough
the Michigan wrongful death act provides for additional damages benefitting the decedent’s next of kin
for loss of society and companionship, it does not create a separate cause of action independent of the
underlying rights of the decedent. Rather, the cause of action is expressly made derivative of the decedent’s rights.”).
241. Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661, 665 (Ala. 2004).
242. Id. at 664-65.
243. Estate of Decamacho ex rel. Guthrie v. La Solana Care & Rehab, Inc., 316 P.3d 607, 614 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2014) (“[A] wrongful death claim is independently held by the decedent’s statutory beneficiaries. . . . [T]he wrongful death claim . . . is not subject to the terms of the admission agreement’s arbitration clause.”); Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 57 (citation omitted) (“[A]
wrongful-death action does not accrue until death and is not brought for the benefit of the decedent’s
estate, but for the next of kin who are the true parties in interest. Plaintiff, as [decedent’s] personal representative in the wrongful-death action, is merely a nominal party, effectively filing suit as a statutory
trustee on behalf of the next of kin. Plaintiff is not prosecuting the wrongful-death claim on behalf of
[decedent], and thus plaintiff is not bound by [decedent’s] agreement to arbitrate for purposes of this
cause of action.”); Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 599 (Ky. 2012) (“Because under our
law the wrongful death claim is not derived through or on behalf of the resident, but accrues separately
to the wrongful death beneficiaries and is meant to compensate them for their own pecuniary loss, we
agree with the Courts cited above which have held that a decedent cannot bind his or her beneficiaries
to arbitrate their wrongful death claim.”); Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 529 (Mo. 2009)
(“[Decedent] could not be a party to the wrongful death suit resulting from her death. A claim for wrongful death is not derivative from any claims [the decedent] might have had, and the damages are not
awarded to the wrongful death plaintiffs on [the decedent’s] behalf. . . . [Decedent’s son], as the plaintiff
in the wrongful death action, is not bound by the arbitration agreement signed by [decedent].”); Peters
v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 115 Ohio St.3d 134, 2007-Ohio-4787, 873 N.E.2d 1258, at ¶ 19 (“Thus,
a decedent cannot bind his or her beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful-death claims.”). But see Allen
v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 379 (Colo. 2003) (applying arbitration agreement to wrongful death plaintiffs
by looking at the contracting parties’ intent and the terms of the contract even though “a wrongful death
claim is separate and distinct from a cause of action the deceased could have maintained had he survived.”).
244. Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ¶ 40, 189 P.3d 40.
245. Id. at ¶ 23.
246. Id. at ¶¶ 36-37.
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action.247 The court noted that “wrongful death actions are derivative of decedents’
injuries but are not derivative of decedents’ rights.” 248 Finally, an Oklahoma court
also “held that a decedent cannot bind the beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful
death claim.”249 The state’s wrongful death statute created a “new cause of action”
that allows the surviving spouse, children, or next of kin of the decedent to seek
compensation for their losses.250 As such, the Oklahoma court found no error in the
trial court’s decision to deny the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration of the
wrongful death claim.251
One person signing an arbitration agreement cannot typically bind another person unless they are that person’s agent. However, the nursing home context complicates the issue because arbitration agreements in admission contracts are signed
by individuals acting on the resident’s behalf or the now deceased resident. Additionally, many parties disputing motions to compel arbitration are nonsignatories to
the original contract, either the resident who had an agent sign on his or her behalf
or the deceased resident’s estate or heir. Since courts across the country vary in
their approaches, it is hard to predict whether a court will find a third-party beneficiary. In the end, the terms of the contract, the intent of the contracting parties, the
signor of the contract, the party bringing the claim against the nursing home, and
whether the arbitration provision is contained within the admission contract will
affect whether a court will find someone a third-party beneficiary. For wrongful
death claims, the outcome will largely depend on the court’s interpretation of the
state’s wrongful death statute.

2.

Unconscionability

The FAA allows a court to apply state laws “if that law arose to govern issues
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” 252
Thus, “traditional state law defenses to contract formation such as unconscionability”253 can invalidate arbitration agreements without violating section 2 of the
FAA.254
Unconscionability is a defense to contract formation “which serves to relieve a
party from an unfair contract or from an unfair portion of a contract.” 255 Unconscionability can invalidate contracts when there is an “absence of meaningful choice
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably
favorable to the other party.”256 However, absence of meaningful choice is not determinative of unconscionability, especially if there is grossly unequal bargaining
247. Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 2013 PA Super 232, 77 A.3d 651, 663.
248. Id. at 660. See also N. Health Facilities v. Batz, 993 F. Supp. 2d 485, 496 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (“[A]
review of Pennsylvania Supreme Court case law discloses that, over the past half century, it has consistently treated wrongful death claims as independent claims derived from the rights of a different plaintiff
than the decedent.”).
249. Boler v. Sec. Health Care, L.L.C., 2014 OK 80, ¶ 26, 336 P.3d 468, 477.
250. Id. at ¶ 27.
251. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.
252. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). The court went on to state that state laws that
derive meaning from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comply with §2 of the FAA.
Id.
253. Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 488-89 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
254. Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
255. Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
256. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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power.257 Yet inequality in bargaining power, in and of itself, will usually not invalidate a contract.258 Rather, the defense of unconscionability is meant to prevent
sophisticated parties with more bargaining power from taking advantage of less sophisticated parties.259
Unconscionability “guard[s] against one-sided contracts, oppression and unfair
surprise.”260 Unconscionability is “linked inextricably with the process of contract
formation” even though “[o]ppression and unfair surprise can occur during the bargaining process or . . . become evidence later, when a dispute or other circumstances invoke the objectively unreasonable terms.” 261 All of the circumstances
surrounding contract formation, including the setting, purpose, and the effect of a
contract, help determine whether it is unconscionable.262
Courts typically “look at both the procedural and substantive aspects of a contract to determine whether, considered together, they make the agreement or provision in question unconscionable.”263 In general, unconscionability has two elements: “procedural unconscionability, i.e., the formalities of making the contract,
and substantive unconscionability, i.e., the terms set forth in the contract.” 264 The
procedural component involves the circumstances surrounding the entering of the
contract; thus, the court focuses on whether the parties had a reasonable opportunity
to understand the terms of the contract and had a meaningful choice in accepting
it.265
One critical question to ask regarding unconscionability is whether “each party
to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable
opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms
hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices?”266 Unconscionability is critical defense to contract formation because “when a party of
little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his
consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the
terms.”267 In that case, “the court should consider whether the terms of the contract
are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.” 268
The unique nature of nursing home admission contracts, and the arbitration
agreements contained therein, places them at more of a risk of unconscionability.
For example, in Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., the Ohio Court of Appeals found
an arbitration clause unconscionable when signed by the spouse of a nursing home
257. See id. (“In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining power.”).
258. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 1999).
259. United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1998).
260. Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 492-93 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
261. Id. at 493.
262. Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 545 (Mass. 2007); Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d at
449.
263. Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 433 (Mo. 2015). See Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret.
Corp. of Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 532-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
264. Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 781 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2015). Accord AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011); State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo.
2006).
265. Prieto, 919 So. 2d at 533.
266. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d at 449.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 450.
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admittee because the spouse “at the time she signed the document, was concerned
about the immediate health of her husband and was in no position to review and
fully appreciate the terms of the agreement.”269 Mrs. Small’s experience is common
among family members and the elderly who sign contracts upon admission into a
nursing home under similar conditions.270
In most cases, a contract must be both procedurally and substantively unconscionable to be invalid.271 Procedural and substantive unconscionability guard
against “one-sided contracts, oppression and unfair surprise.” 272

i.

Procedural Unconscionability

Procedural unconscionability deals with the process and circumstances surrounding contract formation and the form of the contract. 273 The existence of “inequities, improprieties, or unfairness in the bargaining process and formation of the
contract” evidence procedural unconscionability. 274 Inadequacies regarding the
age, sophistication, or knowledge of a party may result in a lack of voluntary consent or a lack of knowledge opportunity to understand or negotiate contract terms
support a finding of procedural unconscionability. 275
Procedural unconscionability also exists when there is unfair surprise. 276 Unfair surprise “involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms are
hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.” 277
The use of fine print and convoluted or unduly complex language can cause unfair
surprise.278
Procedural unconscionability often stems from contracts of adhesion.279 A contract of adhesion is a contract drafted by a party of superior bargaining power and
imposed on a weaker party who must accept or reject the contract as it is rather than
269. Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 159 Ohio App. 3d 66, 72, 2004-Ohio-5757, 823 N.E.2d 19, at
¶ 9 (6th Dist.).
270. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
271. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011) (stating that unconscionability
requires both a procedural and substantive element); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d
217, 227 (W. Va. 2012); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). Traditionally, Missouri courts “viewed unconscionability in the context of procedural unconscionability,
i.e., the formalities of making the contract, and substantive unconscionability, i.e., the terms set forth in
the contract.” Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 781 F.3d 963, 968-69 (8th Cir. 2015). However, Missouri
courts now “shall limit review of the defense of unconscionability to the context of its relevance to
contract formation.” Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 492 n.3 (Mo. 2012).
272. Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 492-93.
273. See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999); Repair Masters Constr.,
Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc.,
861 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Gainsville Health Care Ctr. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 284
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507, 517 (Miss. 2005) overruled by Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d
695 (Miss. 2009).
274. Brown, 729 S.E.2d at 227.
275. Id. See Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732, 737 (Miss. 2007)
overruled by Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So.
3d 695 (Miss. 2009); Gainsville, 857 So. 2d at 284.
276. Harris, 183 F.3d at 181.
277. See Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381 (2001).
278. Harris, 183 F.3d at 181; Brown v. Genesis Healthcare, 729 S.E.2d 217, 227 (W. Va. 2012).
279. Brown, 729 S.E.2d at 228 (“Procedural unconscionability often begins with a contract of adhesion.”).
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negotiate the terms.280 Contracts of adhesion offered on this “take-it-or-leave-it basis”281 are not per se unconscionable.282 Nevertheless, a contract of adhesion
strongly suggests a contract is procedurally unconscionable since contracts of adhesion suggest a lack of “meaningful choice” by the parties. 283 Still, a contract of
adhesion by itself does not always require a finding of procedural unconscionability.284 Rather, contracts of adhesion require further analysis to determine whether
they should be enforced.285

ii.

Substantive Unconscionability

Courts assess substantive unconscionability by looking at the contract terms
themselves and determining “whether the terms of the agreement are commercially
reasonable, fair, and consistent with public policy.” 286 Contract terms that are unduly harsh and one-sided,287 or so “outrageously unfair as to shock the judicial conscience”288 suggest that a contract is substantively unconscionable. Oppressive contract terms also evidence substantive unconscionability; oppression exists when unequal bargaining power “results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful
choice.”289 Substantively unconscionable contracts may include oppressive terms
that deprive one party of all the benefits of the contract or leave one party without
a remedy for the other party’s breach or nonperformance.290 Contracts of adhesion,
or contracts and drafted by the dominant party – usually on printed forms – and
presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis to the other party who has no real chance

280. Id.
281. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 669 (N.M. 2014).
282. See In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. 2008); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 117 Ohio St.3d 352, 2008-Ohio-938, 884 N.E.2d 12, at ¶ 50.
283. Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
284. VoiceStream Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Commc’ns, Inc., 912 So. 2d 34, 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
285. Am. Food Mgmt., Inc. v. Henson, 434 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (“Finding that there is
an adhesion contract is the beginning point for analysis, not the end of it; what courts aim at doing is
distinguishing good adhesion contracts which should be enforced from bad adhesion contracts which
should not.”).
286. Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 304 P.3d 409, 417-18 (N.M. 2013); Repair Masters Const., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp.
of Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
287. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011); State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider,
194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int’l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d
624, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
288. Prieto, 919 So. 2d at 533.
289. Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381; Funding, 597 S.W.2d at 634; People by Abrams v. Two Wheel
Corp., 525 N.E.2d 692, 695 (1988); State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006)
(en banc); Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 492-93.
290. See Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d
695, 699-700 (Miss. 2009). An example of an unconscionable one-sided agreement would be one that
allows one party to go to sue in court, but restricts the other to arbitration. See Pridgen v. Green Tree
Fin. Servicing Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 655, 658 (S.D. Miss. 2000). See also McFarland v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A., 810 F.3d 273, 279 (4th Cir. 2016) (“A contract term is substantively unconscionable only if
it is both ‘one-sided’ and ‘overly harsh’ as to the disadvantaged party.”); Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.,
183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Substantive unconscionability refers to contractual terms that are
unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does not assent.”).
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to negotiate the terms,291 are not automatically substantively unconscionable but
they do make it easier to prove that the contract is substantively unconscionable. 292

V. CONCLUSION
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Marmet v. Health Care Center, Inc. v.
Brown that states cannot prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements of personal injury or wrongful death claims against nursing homes because it would be a “categorical rule” that is “contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA,” 293 arbitration
in nursing home contracts continues to be challenged. 294 Unconscionability, signatory issues, and applicability to third-parties constitute the more successful defenses
raised against enforcing arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts. Since
total prohibition of such agreements contradicts the Supreme Court’s holding, a
better solution includes educating potential residents and attorneys about the implications of these agreements and the strategies to combat enforcement. Specifically,
attorneys should work to prevent enforcement of unfair arbitration agreements
against vulnerable nursing home residents and their families by relying on defenses
discussed in this article.295 Discussing and educating the public, community leaders, state employees, elder law attorneys, and healthcare workers about the risks of
mandatory arbitration in nursing home admission contracts can help mitigate the
risks involved in signing these provisions.
Another option is to eliminate wrongful death actions from mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts. Such action would only change the
forum for resolving their disputes rather than sacrificing plaintiffs’ rights in the admissions process.296 In wrongful death actions, beneficiaries should have the ability
to choose the forum for seeking justice for the negligence that lead to the death of
a friend or family member.297
There are other ways to ensure fairness in both the arbitration agreement and
the admission process besides excluding wrongful death actions from nursing home
arbitration agreements.298 The use of fair and unambiguous model arbitration agreements in nursing home admission contracts could help remedy the problem. The
American Healthcare Association, the largest association of long term care providers in the country,299 has suggested “best practices” for arbitration in nursing home
admission contracts, “recommending voluntary agreements that are set apart from
the admission document and that include rescission language.”300 Such “best practices” would allow nursing homes to enjoy the cost-saving benefits of arbitration

291. E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 716 (Miss. 2002).
292. Moulds, 14 So. 3d at 701.
293. Marmet Health Care Ctr, Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 532-33 (2012) (per curiam).
294. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 103-289 and accompanying text.
296. Scheller, supra note 91, at 572.
297. Scheller, supra note 91, at 572.
298. See Scheller, supra note 91, at 572 (“Courts should clarify . . . who has authority to bind the party
to arbitration upon signing the agreement. Legislatures could . . . [define] whether ‘health care decisions’
include agreements to arbitrate.”).
299. Am.
Health
Care
Ass’n,
Who
We
Are,
AHCA
HOME,
https://www.ahcancal.org/about_ahca/Pages/Who-We-Are.aspx (last visited April 1, 2016).
300. AON GLOBAL RISK CONSULTING, supra note 44, at 2-3.
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without compromising the treatment and quality of care of nursing home residents.301
Since many adults will either enter nursing homes themselves or arrange such
care for a loved one, and all taxpayers will have to bear the increasing costs of
healthcare, the problems associated with mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing home admission contracts have the potential to affect the entire country. Such
high stakes require careful, pragmatic, and balanced approaches to addressing arbitration in nursing home contracts will help ensure that nursing homes can provide
adequate care to residents and that plaintiffs can find adequate resolution of disputes
through the legal system.

301. Palm, supra note 38, at 483.
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